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Abstract:  It seems as if there are things that have what we might call personal value—special objects, artwork 
by our children, etc.  This term is meant to mark a difference between things whose value seems tied to a 
particular person, as opposed to things (like the Mona Lisa) that are valuable, period.  The concept of personal 
value hasn’t received much focused attention, but I believe that it is of not only theoretical, but practical 
importance.  In this paper, I explore the practical angle, arguing that personal value is important to our ability 
to make sense of ourselves.  I give several desiderata for an account of personal value, and use examples to 
raise questions for Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen’s recent analysis of personal value.  This practical stance leads 
me to offer an amendment to this analysis. 
 
It seems as though some things have what we might call personal value.  That is, their value seems 
particularly tied to a specific person in a way that other valuable things are not.  That is, the value of 
things like your favorite mug or your child’s scribbly drawing seems different from the value of the 
Mona Lisa and social justice.  The former don’t have much (if any) value in the grand scheme of 
things, but the latter do.  But we wouldn’t want to say that your favorite mug isn’t valuable; it might 
have quite a bit of value to you.  This difference hasn’t received much concentrated attention in 
philosophical literature, but I think it is of not only theoretical, but practical interest.  It is the 
practical angle I wish to explore in this paper.  In particular, I want to argue that the purpose of a 
notion of personal value is to help us sort what is important to us from what is not—and that we 
need this concept in order to make sense of our lives.  A sense of the practical significance of the 
notion should, then, shape an account of it, and at the end of the paper I offer some suggestions 
toward this end. 
To get directly to the point, I claim that the reason we need a notion of personal value is that 
impersonal value is pervasive and overwhelming and we can’t adequately respond to it all.  One way 
to think of the problem that hoarders have is that they have difficulty letting things go because they 
not only recognize value in the most mundane objects, but also have an overdeveloped sense of 
responsibility to respond to that value—in particular, by possessing and keeping the objects.  But 
hoarding is just an extreme case of clutter, which is (so I think) the result of a tendency most of us 
have: the tendency to appreciate value.  This is a basic fact of life.   
Creatures as sophisticated as we are have cognitive and emotional capacities that are deeply 
intertwined,1 and which allow for a great deal of nuance in our perception, recognition, and 
                                                 
1 Cite Bennett Helm. 
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appreciation of value.  We find value in things beyond those that satisfy our basic needs; we are 
uplifted by sunsets, we fight for freedom and justice, we care about other people.  In this sense, we 
think that there are things that matter, period.  This mattering doesn’t have to be grand; things can 
matter in minor ways, for instance by being useful for everyday life (as, for instance, can openers 
are).  These things that matter have impersonal value, that is, value that is not specifically related to 
particular valuers, or that we value without reference to anything or anyone else.  In addition to the 
many specific valuing attitudes, we are capable of a great many different actions in response to the 
recognition of value.  For instance, considering just one example, recognition of the value of art can 
range from believing that art is a good thing, to visiting art museums, to collecting art, to lobbying 
for legislation to fund the National Endowment for the Arts.   
Given the enormous range of objects in the world (including abstract ones like justice), their 
manifold shades of significance, and the wide range of appropriate responses to this significance, the 
world should seem overwhelmingly full of value, much the way it is overwhelmingly full of light, 
color and noise to a newborn baby.  But it doesn’t.  Just as a baby learns to focus attention and 
differentiate objects from one another, we learn to focus our valuing and concentrate on just some 
of the value in the world, adopting it as our own.  We take out a stake in it, so to speak.  This 
attachment to some valuable things is what makes it possible to operate successfully in the world.  
So we can think of personal value as a kind of attention: it helps us to pick out of the “blooming, 
buzzing confusion” the things that matter most to us.  This serves in contexts as concrete as clearing 
out the clutter in our living and working spaces, or as broad and abstract as the architecture of our 
personal lives, and on many levels in between. 
To begin to understand the idea of personal value, let’s look at a sample of things that seem, 
at least on the surface, to have it.  My favorite example is my raggedy old stuffed pink rabbit Pete.  
He was my favorite toy when I was a child, and as a result his fur is worn off and his tail is hanging 
by a thread; surely no one who didn’t know me would find him valuable, and the only reason that 
those who do know me will value him is derived from my valuing him.  He is something that has 
virtually no impersonal value, but a great deal of personal value.  He has what we often term 
“sentimental” value. 
 What else can have personal value?  The laptop I’m using to write this has a great deal of 
personal value to me, but it is not at all like Pete’s sentimental value.  This computer contains files 
that are important to me for both personal and professional reasons.  Although my important files 
are backed up, the loss of this computer would be quite significant, because it is an important tool 
that I use nearly all the time.  But unlike Pete, nothing hinges on its being this particular computer.  I 
could, with reasonable ease, transfer all of the files that matter to me to another computer.  Then 
that computer would take on the significance that this one has.  What matters is that I have a 
computer, not that I have this computer. 
 The photograph of stones under the rippling water of Lake Superior that hangs above our 
kitchen table also has personal value to me.  There are a number of reasons for this, but the one I 
want to highlight has to do with the fact that I find it visually appealing.  Again, unlike Pete, nothing 
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hangs on its being this particular photograph; I would be just as happy with a copy.  It has plenty of 
impersonal aesthetic merit as well, but surely it wouldn’t appeal to everyone as something striking 
enough to hang on the wall in their homes.  Taste is a famously personal thing.  
 So far I have named things as objects of personal value.  But personal value can accrue to 
much more abstract things as well.  Personal value is often manifested in the roles by which we 
identify ourselves, often through relationships, work and hobbies: I am a wife and mother, a friend 
to some particular people, a teacher, a philosopher, a pianist, a bibliophile, etc.  These roles are 
important to me, and I care about performing them well.  They give most of the structure to my life.   
 Another way to structure our lives is to dedicate time and money to causes that matter to us 
in a personal way.  Some people care in this way about political issues like abortion, gay marriage, or 
public health care; others about preserving wild habitat; others about curing cancer; the list goes on.  
Most of us recognize the impersonal value in many different causes, but most of us also only give a 
place in our lives to a small handful of these causes.  We engage in activities to support the ones that 
are personally valuable to us, and leave the rest to others to whom they matter more. 
 These examples suggest that the notion of personal value is centrally involved in the way we 
structure our lives and build our sense of ourselves.  This is quite obvious in the big-picture things 
like roles and causes, and as a result you might think I’ve made a slide from the idea of personal 
value as a kind of quality that stuff can have, to personal values as principles by which I try to live.  
But personal values in this latter sense are equally present when thinking about value as a quality that 
things like Pete, my computer, and my wall décor can have.  As Sam Gosling demonstrates in his 
“snooping” research, we are reflected in our stuff.2  What we care about is manifested not only in 
what we possess, but in the way we arrange it in our living and work spaces.  When chosen well, our 
possessions form extensions of ourselves and help us maintain our sense of who we are, both for 
ourselves privately and for others publicly.3  Because of this, in other work I have suggested that 
what goes wrong when we experience our stuff as clutter is largely a matter of being out of sync with 
what we really care about.  Things’ having personal value is deeply intertwined with our acting on 
our personal values. 
 Furthermore, personal values in the architectural sense are very often4 our individual stake in 
something that is of impersonal value.  Similarly, objects with personal value often have it because, 
                                                 
2 Sam Gosling, Snoop: What Your Stuff Says About You, New York: Basic, 2008. 
3 Russell W. Belk (“Possessions and the Extended Self,” Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Sep., 1988), pp. 
139-168).  In his discussion, Belk surveys an extensive literature on the ways that different objects come to be 
incorporated in our sense of self.  The psychology here is fascinating. 
4 Perhaps always, though I am not prepared to argue this at present.  It is a difficult question whether it is possible to 
confer positive personal value legitimately on something that does not (and never did) have impersonal value.  On a first 
pass, it seems unlikely.  Rawls’ example of the grass counter works the way it does because it seems clear that (without 
some further story) grass counting is a worthless project, and you can’t just make it a worthy project by adopting it as 
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at least initially, they have some impersonal value.  Even Pete, who at this point has no meaningful 
impersonal value, did have some when he was new: he was a good plaything for a toddler, and could 
have been so for any toddler.   
So things have personal value when they are related in some important way to someone’s 
personal values. If this is right, then the questions are: What are personal values?, and What way is that? 
I believe that examining a particular account of personal value will guide us toward answers 
to these questions.  Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen ably explicates a notion of personal value in his recent 
book Personal Value.  His focus in that book, however, is on the metaethics of the notion; he is 
interested in defending the idea against those who claim that all value is impersonal, and spends little 
time on the practical side, explaining the idea or its significance.  I find his account attractive, and 
am glad that someone has undertaken the difficult metaethical work.  In what follows, I would like 
                                                                                                                                                             
your project.  We also don’t want to let people turn sadistic pleasure into something of genuine positive value.  And it 
has to be possible that we can be mistaken in our valuings—that we can value things that aren’t actually valuable (even 
given the fact of our valuing them).  Still, if we take seriously the idea of personal value, we must take subjectivity 
seriously, which creates a question as to how we can eliminate things like sadistic pleasure from having legitimate value.    
 Furthermore, an account of personal value must also be able to explain how (for instance) Pete, or a poem 
written by a young child (to borrow an example from Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen), can be of personal but not impersonal 
value.  I suggest that Pete wouldn’t have any personal value without his initially having had some impersonal value as a 
plaything for a child (assuming playthings for children are good, period, because they are what children need in order to 
develop well).  It could be argued that the child’s poem has some impersonal value, for instance by claiming that it’s 
good, period, that children express their creativity as part of growing and developing.  But it could also be argued that 
these suggestions are a stretch, largely because these supposed kernels of impersonal value are not why I value the 
objects.  I value Pete because of my history with him; I value the poem because it’s my child’s  work.  These things simply 
don’t have the same value to anyone likely to read this sentence.  The poem doesn’t have the kind of impersonal value 
that a Shakespearean sonnet has—unlike the sonnet, the thing itself isn’t really impersonally valuable—but it has a sliver 
of impersonal value, which is amplified for me because of my relationship to its author.  The claim that the tiny amount 
of impersonal value that the poem has (e.g. as an example of a child’s creativity, which is a good thing, period) is the 
seed of the great personal value I find in it might just seem to be holding a position at any cost.  Taking this sort of 
position might commit us to nearly anything’s having some sort of impersonal value.   
 But is this really so implausible?  Consider our relationships with other people.  From an impersonal 
standpoint, we’re all equally valuable—we all have a welfare, a dignity, or whatever other quality you want to use to claim 
that people are valuable.  As a matter of fact, however, we don’t value all people equally.  We have relationships that 
make some more valuable to us than others in a personal sense.  But, at least in what we typically call “voluntary” 
relationships such as friendship, the foundation lies in the recognition of the impersonal value that the other person has.  
Personal value is built on this, as a result of relationship.  Why not think that all personal value works like this, including 
what we find in things like stuffed animals and children’s poetry?  After all, I don’t preserve my child’s dirty diapers.  
Not just anything he produces is valuable to me; I don’t think it’s implausible to claim that something like a poem he 
writes is valuable to me as his particular instance of something that is of impersonal value.  This may not be the causal or 
phenomenological story—in fact, it probably isn’t—but if you ask me why I value it, upon analysis the idea that it’s an 
example of childhood creativity will probably show up somewhere.  I don’t take this to be a knock-down argument, but 
it is enough, I think, to make the claim a viable possibility. 
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to use his theoretical account as a starting point for my more practically-oriented discussion.  In the 
end I will offer an amendment to his account. 
Rønnow-Rasmussen claims, rightly I think, that there is more to personal value than simply 
welfare.  Among the things he notes as having personal value are not only certain mental states (such 
as enjoyment), but also “things like poems, tombstones, and the like, and…obtainings of (abstract) 
states of affairs such as, say, the fact that my favorite football team wins” (section 2.0; Kindle 
location 473).  We might say that, according to Rønnow-Rasmussen, personal value includes not 
only what is good5 for me, but things that are goods for me—things I find to be particularly good.  
“The role of values,” he writes in the preface, “is different [from the impact an object has on one’s 
life]: they function, generally speaking, as reason-grounded incentives or disincentives to action and 
the formation of attitudes.  Objects [with personal value] set more or less negotiable boundaries 
dictating what we must, should, may, or have reason to, do or not do with them.”  This suggests that 
personal values set volitional boundaries for us, and help to define us as the persons we are.  
Personal value, then, is different from mere significance or valence.   
At the beginning of the book, he describes an object of personal value to him as having “a 
value that relate[s] in some way to me as a person in a way other valuable things do not” (s. 1.0, K. 
196).  He glosses “personal value” as “value-for.”  “Personal values accrue to objects in virtue of the 
fact that those objects have value-for, or are valuable to, someone—not in virtue of the fact that those 
objects have value simpliciter, or are valuable, period” (preface, K.122; emphasis original).  A poem 
written by his young daughter has value, he claims, but not the same kind of value that a 
Shakespearean sonnet has.   
  The two questions that Rønnow-Rasmussen thinks an analysis of personal value has to face 
are: “In what sense is personal value a kind of value?  And (if it is a value) in what sense is this value 
personal?” (preface, K. 32).  He also differentiates between a genuine evaluation of “good-for” 
(which is objective) and the subjective notion of what is good from someone’s perspective (a 
perspective that may be mistaken) (preface, K. 41). 
So far, the parameters for an account of personal value seem to be the following.  The 
account must: 
(a) differentiate personal from impersonal value (value, period). 
(b) differentiate personal value from mere impact on or significance for a person. 
                                                 
5 The term “value” is unfortunately ambiguous between a positive connotation (when we say something is valuable, we 
mean to praise it) and a neutral one (something has value when it has a certain kind of significance—either good or bad.)  
For ease of exposition, I typically follow ordinary language and use “value” to mean positive value (unless otherwise 
noted).  But the reader should keep this ambiguity in mind; just as things can have positive (personal) value, they can 
also have negative (personal) value. 
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(c) distinguish genuine personal value from mere subjective attraction, or what a person 
thinks is good; I take this to mean that the analysis must account for the possibility that we can make 
mistakes about our own personal values. 
I would add a few more desiderata.  The account should also: 
(d) provide a way of understanding how others should respond to personal value, and 
perhaps also the fact of personal valuation (even when it is mistake). 
(e) convey a sense of the normativity of (personal) value, i.e., the idea that value has a kind of 
claim on our responses. 
Rønnow-Rasmussen’s gloss on personal value is the following:  
An object x’s value for a person a (i.e. x’s personal value) consists in the existence of normative reasons for 
favoring/disfavoring x for a’s sake—where this favoring/disfavoring is an Identity For-Someone’s-Sake 
(FSS) attitude. (K. 1370)6  
The specifying clause means, roughly, that (a) in favoring or disfavoring x, we have a person in mind 
rather than effects or implications, and that (b) this person figures in the intentional content of the 
attitude, so that a favoring for my sake is different from a favoring for your sake.  Furthermore, (c) 
the specific identity of the person matters; the attitude would change or disappear were the object of 
the attitude different.  Rønnow-Rasmussen spends considerable time discussing the details of “for-
someone’s-sake” and related attitudes, but for current purposes I think this sketch will do.   
 Note at the outset that this account clearly satisfies desiderata (a), (c), (d), and (e).  My 
investigation will bring into question whether it also satisfies (b).  In outline, I believe that Rønnow-
Rasmussen and I agree on quite a bit.  But I believe that the practical stance can bring out some 
important points of discussion.  To this end, let’s take a look at how some of my examples fare on 
this analysis. 
 On Rønnow-Rasmussen’s account, Pete’s personal value consists in the existence of reasons 
for favoring Pete for my sake.  I think this works just fine for why you should favor Pete.  But why 
should I value Pete?  Not, surely, because he’s pretty or useful (though perhaps when I was little, use 
could be counted as a reason); rather, it’s because of what he means to me—his connection to my 
childhood memories.  Like the Velveteen Rabbit, I made him special by playing with him, taking him 
everywhere, imagining that he was keeping watch over my room at night and fighting off the coucas 
(a breed of imaginary monsters).  Is loving him for what he means to me a kind of loving him for 
my own sake?  His meaning derives in part from his significance to my identity—for his role in my 
imaginative life when I was young, which is an aspect of myself that I still value.   
                                                 
6 (An Identity FSS attitude is one that would disappear if the identity of the person changed; it is not dependent on 
universal properties of a (K. 1308) (love is a typical identity attitude; admiration a typical non-identity attitude).  
Rønnow-Rasmussen doesn’t think the identity part is strictly necessary, but thinks that the most “interesting” personal 
values will involve Identity FSS attitudes.) 
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Although this seems quite plausible, we might worry that this amounts to having reasons to 
value him because I value him.  This seems on the surface, at least, to put the cart before the horse; 
shouldn’t reasons be prior to attitudes?  There is a significant literature devoted to arguing that 
desires (and other attitudes) are transparent to the reasons to have them, so that they never in 
themselves constitute reasons.  Moreover, if valuing created reasons to value, then we could not be 
mistaken in our valuings.  My devotion to grass counting, or to the things I hoard, would be 
unassailable.  And furthermore, this would go against the buck-passing spirit in which Rønnow-
Rasmussen offers his account. 
Nevertheless, it actually seems quite plausible that my reason to value Pete is my valuing 
him.  This is because of an equivocation on “valuing”—in valuing Pete for my own sake I’m valuing 
him in two different ways.  The bottom (first-order) layer is the basic fact of my affection for this 
floppy-eared, tattered old bunny.  We can find plenty of explanatory reasons for this affection, but in 
this sort of case we don’t usually seek justifying reasons, since the explanation is quite ordinary and 
normal.  We just take the attachment as a (perhaps quirky) fact about me.  An implication of this fact 
is that this object is tied to my welfare: if something were to happen to Pete, I would be distressed.  
Here we come to the next layer: in light of this attachment, how should we treat Pete?  You 
wouldn’t drag him through the mud, you wouldn’t throw him out, you wouldn’t tear his tail off—
but not because he’s all that great in himself.  You wouldn’t do these things because of me.  Neither 
would I, and I don’t think that the reason for this is limited to my first-order affection for Pete.  It is 
also for my own sake, because I would be upset if any of these things happened to him.  I can take a 
reflective perspective and from there observe my first-order affection, appreciate the implications of 
it for my own welfare, and take those implications to be reasons to treat him well (and to allow the 
affection to continue).   
Notice that on this analysis, the affection itself is not the reason to treat Pete well; I have not 
violated the position of the anti-desire-based-reasons camp.  Your reasons for favoring Pete (and 
some of mine) have to do with me as a person, with the fact that (because I care about this pink 
rabbit) I am such that abusing the pink rabbit would upset me.  So, in order not to upset me—i.e. 
for my sake—you treat the rabbit nicely.  In part for this same reason, so do I. 
Let’s turn next to my computer.  It seems to have personal value, but not the sentimental 
kind of personal value that Pete has.  It has personal value as a vital instrument for my career 
(among other things).  Since my career is important to me (it is something by which I nurture and 
define myself, as well as a way of supporting myself), this computer is important to me.  But any 
computer that would function in the same way will do; unlike Pete, there’s nothing specific about 
this computer that attaches me to it.  Does its importance fit Rønnow-Rasmussen’s analysis of 
personal value?  It seems so: you (and I) have reasons to value the computer for my sake—because 
of its role in my work, which is central to who I am.   
Now, of course, this computer’s connection to me is contingent; it happens to be the 
computer that holds the files I need to do my work.  If it didn’t, you might value it for other reasons, 
but not for my sake.  Still, there’s no reason to think that contingency is a problem for 
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understanding personal value.  Given its great instrumental importance to me, there are reasons to 
favor it for my sake.  Would these reasons disappear if it were someone else’s computer?  Yes, these 
particular reasons would, though other reasons for, say, refraining from destroying the computer 
might remain. 
One thing the computer example highlights is that Rønnow-Rasmussen’s account of 
personal value does not explain any difference there may be between sentimental and “ordinary” 
personal value.  Pete has a special kind of value that the computer doesn’t have, at least in part 
because Pete is irreplaceable.  This may not be a shortcoming.  Like impersonal value, things can 
have more and less personal value; perhaps the computer has less than Pete does.  More likely, it’s 
not a matter of more and less, but simply the difference between instrumental and final value: 
sentimental value is a kind of final personal value, such that we value the thing itself (rather than its 
effects or its usefulness) for someone’s sake. 
A question that the computer example raises, however, is whether Rønnow-Rasmussen’s 
analysis lets too much into the category of personal value.  Consider my can opener.  It’s something 
I use, and which I wouldn’t want to be without, but I don’t particularly care about it—certainly any 
functional can opener will do.  Can opening doesn’t figure in any projects that I would (pre-
theoretically) call projects of personal value.  I do, of course, value eating.  But the “project” of 
eating isn’t really something by which I define myself; it is more like a background condition.  Still, 
given that I do need to eat and that I occasionally need to open cans to do so, the can opener seems 
like something there are reasons to favor for my sake.  (If you were helping me gather supplies to 
stock the kitchen in my first apartment, a can opener would make the list.  This seems like favoring, 
though of course it’s not particularly strong favoring.) 
If this is right, then anything that I could find even a little bit of instrumental value in might 
be something with personal value to me.  One alternative here is to simply accept this, and claim 
that as a matter of fact, an awful lot of stuff has personal value to someone.  If we accept the 
premise that the purpose of personal value has to do with carving out a manageable sphere of value, 
this doesn’t necessarily seem hard to swallow.  After all, I do draw the line somewhere.  I might have 
a can opener in my kitchen, because I sometimes want to open cans, but I don’t have a cookie press 
or a Jell-O mold.   
Still, it’s not unreasonable to feel slightly uncomfortable with this.  The can opener is not 
something I’d rescue in a fire; the computer might be.  Personal value seems to be something more 
special than ordinary instrumental value captures.  Can we eliminate the can opener by invoking the 
clause about identity in Rønnow-Rasmussen’s analysis?  Would your attitude toward the can opener 
change if it were not I for whose sake you favored it?  There is nothing particular about me such that 
I specially need a can opener for my kitchen; anyone who at least sometimes eats at home does.  The 
computer, however, might make this cut.  Being the person I am with the projects I have, a 
computer is a vital tool for me.  But this might not be the case for someone else who is a painter, or 
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an Olympic skater, or a gardener.7  Thus, it looks as though the account can meet criterion (b) 
above, that it distinguish between personal value and mere significance or impact on a person. 
The identity clause might resolve the worry about the analysis’ being too broad with respect 
to including things that don’t seem “special” enough to have personal value, but it points to another 
kind of worry about broadness.  Here the idea is that there may be things that would fit well with 
some self-defining project of mine, but which I don’t have space to own or energy to devote to 
appreciating.  You might be in a bookstore and see a novel that you think I would love, given my 
taste in reading.  It’s so me, in fact, that you have a strong urge to buy it and give it to me.  But then 
you remember that I’m trying to downsize my living space, and I’m working really hard at paring 
down my library.  Or you might hear on the radio about a museum in Denver that I would 
absolutely love to visit if I knew about it and had the means to get to Denver.  But I don’t know 
about it and I’m strapped for cash (and vacation time) anyway.  The book and the museum both 
seem like things there are reasons to favor for my sake, and in particular because I’m me.  But 
should we say that they have personal value for me? 
I’m inclined to think not.  If the purpose of personal value is to carve out a manageable 
space in the world of value, then not everything that there is some reason to favor for my (particular) 
sake can fit.  There are only so many things I can read, own, use, preserve, enjoy, etc.  This suggests 
that we should understand the reasons in the analysis to be not just pro tanto reasons or reasons all 
else held equal, but reasons that are still in force all things considered.8  This would keep open the 
possibility that I could be mistaken in my (first-order) valuings—I might in fact favor things I have 
no (or not enough) reason, all things considered, to favor.  And the fact of my (first-order) valuing 
would not itself be a reason to favor it.  But it preserves the possibility that I might have reasons to 
favor things I don’t in fact (yet) favor, and also preserves the difference between something’s having 
significance for or impact on me and its having personal value (criterion (b) above).  Things I have 
pro tanto reason to favor are things that are significant for me, like the novel and the museum, 
whether I know it or not.  Things with personal value are things I have reason, all things considered, 
to favor, again whether I know it or not. 
                                                 
7 Well, these days pretty much everyone “needs” a computer.  The point here is that the computer doesn’t have the same 
sort of place in the life of a painter, skater, or gardener that it does in the life of an academic. 
8 Reasons can interact in complicated ways, and it is beyond the scope of this work to take a position on whether a 
reason that is outweighed, overridden, cancelled, etc. by some other reason is still a reason or not.  I am inclined to think 
it is.  For present purposes, I wish to remain neutral on the question of whether an “all-things-considered” reason is a 
different thing from a pro tanto reason, so I will skip over the process by which we go from pro tanto reasons to our final 
judgment as to what we have sufficient reason to do and how that process affects the reasons we have.  I will also avoid 
talk of “what we have most reason to do” because, it seems to me, all that matters for personal value is whether we have 
sufficient reason to favor an object, given the other reasons we have and their relative strength; since we have room to 
favor many things, but some more than others, “most” could be misleading. 
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But we need to be careful as to which things are “all” the things to be considered.  Consider 
Pete again, and the personal value he has for me.  Because of my attachment to him, you (and 
everyone else) have reason to favor him to some extent for my sake.  But in the grand scheme of 
things in your life, this reason may not be very strong, and if you have to decide between preserving 
my rabbit and your own teddy bear, all things considered you might have more reason to favor your 
bear.  But this shouldn’t destroy Pete’s personal value for me.  So the personal value has to consist 
in pro tanto (or “all else held equal”) reasons for you, but all-things-considered reasons for me.  Thus, 
perhaps the analysis of personal value should go something more like this: 
An object x’s value for a person a (i.e. x’s personal value) consists in the existence of normative reasons for 
favoring/disfavoring x for a’s “all-things-considered” sake—where this favoring/disfavoring is an Identity 
For-Someone’s-Sake (FSS) attitude. 
Obviously, this is an awkward way to phrase it.  To clean it up a little and to connect the 
analysis more clearly to the purpose of the concept of personal value which I have been advocating, 
I suggest the following: 
An object x’s value for a person a (i.e. x’s personal value) consists in the existence of normative reasons for 
favoring/disfavoring a’s giving x a place in a’s life for a’s sake—where this favoring/disfavoring is an 
Identity For-Someone’s-Sake (FSS) attitude.  
“Giving something a place in one’s life” can be literal, in terms of space, or figurative, in 
terms of time or devotion.  Using the phrase “giving x an place in a’s life” helps to put the “all-
things-considered-ness” of the reason into the right place in the analysis.  It also (I hope!) builds this 
quality into the account, since as a matter of fact there is only so much we can work into our lives.   
This friendly amendment may help alleviate another type of “too broad” worry, which has to 
do with individuals’ ability to recognize and appreciate impersonal value.  If I recognize that the 
Mona Lisa, untamed wilderness, and (the search for) a cure for cancer have impersonal value, aren’t 
I in some sense adopting them as my own?  It might seem quite obvious that the “for someone’s 
sake” clause in Rønnow-Rasmussen’s analysis takes care of this; the appreciation of value that I have 
when (say) I am glad that there are people working on cancer research has no particular connection 
to myself; I just think it’s a good thing, period.  And I can think so without wanting to “join the 
fight” myself by giving or raising money, or assisting in the research.  Right? 
The problem (if it is one) is that having any attitude toward something seems to relate it to 
me in at least a minimal way.  Here’s how the thought goes: if impersonal value has a normative 
element, one that not only warrants but perhaps requires at least some minimal attitudinal response 
from anyone, then in particular it requires it from me.  If this is so, doesn’t the value now relate to 
me specifically, making it personal in some way?  And this might make a space for the attitude to be 
“for someone’s sake”; for at the very least, if I am not to go wrong with respect to value, I ought to 
recognize it.  This “ought” could be construed as being connected to my “sake”, even if we don’t 
read it as a matter of welfare (but, e.g., as a matter of duty).  The worry, if it holds up, threatens to 
turn everything into personal value. 
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I’m not certain that this worry is legitimate, but it might be.  If it is, then either we reject at 
least one of the premises that impersonal value exists and that personal value is different from it, or we find a 
way to delineate the “personal” attitudes—the ones that give us a particular stake in something—
from the impersonal ones.  I don’t think it’s plausible to give up the second premise and believe that 
there is no such thing as personal value.  The possibility that we bite the bullet and accept that there 
may not be impersonal value is intriguing,9 but an argument for this would be an uphill battle and it is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  So what we need is a way of distinguishing the attitudes that give us 
a personal stake in something from those that do not. 
One way to do this may be to invoke Rønnow-Rasmussen’s identity clause.  Perhaps, when 
I’m appreciating value, it may not be for my or any particular others’ sake, but just some unspecified 
others (such as “future generations”).  This might work, but Rønnow-Rasmussen himself recognizes 
the possibility that I refrain from desecrating a cathedral for the sake of the believers, who are not 
specific from my perspective.10   
Perhaps a surer way to delineate the difference is to invoke the “place in the life” clause that 
I offer as an amendment to Rønnow-Rasmussen’s definition.  Cancer research is not a personal value 
for me because, as a practical matter, other things matter more to me and given the limitations on 
my money, time and energy I have no room to give that cause a place in my life.  But I may still be 
glad that cancer research takes place, and value the efforts of those who do the work of raising 
money and performing the research.  In being glad, I still value it in an impersonal way.  Thus, the 
difference is tied in part to the strength and type of attitude (because if I didn’t care about other 
things more, there would be room for me to dedicate myself to the cause of curing cancer), but also 
to the concrete practical question of what I have space in my life to pay attention to. 
Above I suggested that things have personal value when they are related in some important 
way to someone’s personal values.  This gave rise to two questions: What are personal values?, and 
What way is that?  I think we have arrived at an analysis that gives a unified answer to both of these 
questions.  Personal values are the objects (both concrete and abstract) I care about enough to give a 
place in my life to, for my own sake; objects have personal value when I have sufficient reason to 
give them such a place.  The way those objects are related to personal values is in an instrumental or 
contributory sense: they are the things that enable or support my defining my biographical self.  
Now, in claiming that objects of personal value are instrumental or contributory, I am not claiming 
that I cannot value them intrinsically or finally.  Indeed, most of the truly important things in our 
lives are things we value for their own sakes.  But we can value things for their own sakes and for 
our sakes, as we quite often do when things have personal value.  In fact, as Harry Frankfurt has 
                                                 
9 Rønnow-Rasmussen argues that all reasons are agent-relative, a position which strikes me as appealing.  If he is right 




argued, most things couldn’t be personally valuable if it weren’t for our valuing them intrinsically or 
finally.11 
 Now, there are two more test cases I wish to consider before accepting this account as 
satisfying, which have to do with the ways we might go wrong with respect to personal value.  The 
first has to do with whether the account is sufficiently objective.  Does it let in some things we like 
but which we shouldn’t like?  The second has to do with whether we may be unaware of things that 
actually do have personal value for us.  Does it account for the fact that we sometimes ignore or try 
to shut out things that are actually important to us? 
 To address the first question, consider the following.  What if I like something I really 
shouldn’t like—such as smoking?  I can’t pretend to know the psychology of a smoker, but surely 
anyone who smokes today is aware of the dangers and chooses to assume or ignore the risks 
associated with smoking.  If I am a smoker, what should we say about smoking’s personal value for 
me?  I think we should probably say that smoking isn’t a personal value, because of its grave risks to 
health.  And what does the (amended) account say?  The account asks us to consider whether there 
are normative reasons to favor my giving smoking a place in my life for my sake.  There are 
considerable reasons for you (and me) not to favor this.  The question is whether smoking is 
subjectively so important to me that, as in the case of Pete, my first-order attitude toward smoking 
or desire to smoke is a fact about me that is strong enough to outweigh these reasons, so that all 
things considered, it might actually be the case that smoking ought to be part of my life.   
 In Pete’s case, my first-order valuing him ties him to my emotional welfare in a way that, 
particularly given that there are no reasons against favoring him, we should favor him for my sake.  
But the reasons for disfavoring smoking are extremely weighty.  And given that people who get 
smoking-related diseases often take them to be reason to quit, I would think that in general, most 
people value their health over the indulgence in their habit, so that their emotional welfare isn’t tied 
to smoking so deeply as to outweigh the reasons not to.  Thus the account suggests that the answer 
for something like smoking is not necessarily pre-given for every person, but it would take quite a bit 
to outweigh the reasons not to favor it for my sake. 
 If we run the same analysis for objects with a clear moral element, such as pedophilia, it 
seems quite clear that no one, including pedophiles, could have reasons—certainly not all-things-
considered, and probably not even pro tanto—to favor giving it a place in their lives, even for their 
own sakes.  Thus, it seems as though the account of personal value functions as we would wish in 
the cases of valuings that are objectively mistaken. 
 The second question is the reverse of this: What if I haven’t given a place in my life to 
something I should?  This might be the case with a workaholic parent, who spends so much time at 
work that she never gives her children the attention they need?  Or C.S. Lewis in Shadowlands, who 
                                                 
11 Citation.  It’s probably in The Reasons of Love.  
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considers himself a confirmed old bachelor and only realizes the depth of his love for Joy when she 
is stricken with cancer?  Here I think the issue has to do with full awareness or appreciation of the 
object’s true significance for us.  In Lewis’s case, Joy in fact already had the place in his life; the 
reasons to favor his recognizing this and according her this place officially were there but 
unrecognized.  In the case of a workaholic parent, the relationship between parent and child 
provides reasons for the parent to not only give lip service to love for her children, but to perform 
actions that constitute actually giving them their due place in her life.  A best friend might see her 
friend going wrong in this respect and point out the problem.  “You really ought to spend more 
time with your kids and less time at the office; I see how much they miss you.”  Thus, the account 
functions as we would wish in this situation as well. 
 Overall, then, I contend that the amended version of Rønnow-Rasmussen’s account 
captures the desiderata for an account of personal value that I sketched above.  It explains why 
some things that don’t seem to matter in the grand scheme of things do still have a recognizable 
kind of value.  It also captures the practical reasons why we are (or should be) interested in personal 
value, namely that adopting some values as our own reflects the ways we value ourselves and helps 
us to carve a manageable sphere of value in which to live our lives.  
 
